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Information Theoretical Cryptogenography
Sune K Jakobsen
Abstract
We consider problems where n people are communicating and a random subset
of them is trying to leak information, without making it clear who are leaking the
information. We introduce a measure of suspicion, and show that the amount of
leaked information will always be bounded by the expected increase in suspicion,
and that this bound is tight. We ask the question: Suppose a large number of
people have some information they want to leak, but they want to ensure that
after the communication, an observer will assign probability ≤ c to the events
that each of them is trying to leak the information. How much information
can they reliably leak, per person who is leaking? We show that the answer is(
− log(1−c)
c
− log(e)
)
bits.
1 Introduction
The year is 2084 and the world is controlled by a supercomputer called Eve. It
makes the laws, carries them out, has surveillance cameras everywhere, can hear
everything you say, and can break any kind of cryptography. It was designed to
make a world that maximises the total amount of happiness, while still being
fair. However, Eve started to make some unfortunate decisions. For example,
it thought that to maximise the utility it has been designed to maximise, it
must ensure that it survives, so it decided to execute everyone it knew beyond
reasonable doubt was trying to plot against Eve (it was designed so it could
not punish anyone as long as there is reasonable doubt, and reasonable doubt
had been defined to be a 5% chance of being innocent). Everyone agrees that
Eve should be shut down. The only person who can shut down Eve is Frank
who is sitting in a special control room. Eve cannot hurt him, he has access to
everything Eve can see, but he needs a password to shut down Eve. A small
number of people, say 100 Londoners, know the password. Eve or Frank have
no clue who they are, only that they exist. If one of them simply says the
password, Eve will execute the person. So how can they reveal the password,
without any of them getting killed?
Suppose it is known that the password is the name of a museum in London.
Frank then announces a date and time, and if you have the password, you
show up at the correct museum that day and time, and if you do not have the
information, you do as you would otherwise have done. If the museum is not too
big, Frank will notice that there is one museum with more visitors than usual,
so he gets the password. At the same time, if the museum is not too small, a
large fraction of the visitors will just be there by chance, so Eve cannot punish
any of them.
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If the password is not necessarily the name of a museum, Frank can simply
define a one-to-one correspondence between possible passwords and museums
(or, if there are many possible passwords, take one letter at a time, with different
people leaking each letter). We do not actually need museums to use this idea,
the important part is that many people sends some messages, that will follow a
fixed distribution if they do not think about it, and that if they want to, they
can choose a specific message. For example, we could use parity of the minutes
in the time we post messages on a blog. The purpose of this paper is to show
how much information can be leaked this way.
1.1 Previous Work and Our Results
If we assume standard cryptographic assumptions, or if each pair of people had a
private channel, we could use multi-party computation to let one person reveal
information to a group of n people, in such a way that if more than half of
them follow the protocol, a computationally bounded observer will only have
a negligible advantage when trying to guess which of the collaborating parties
who originally had the information [4, 6]. If we allow Frank to communicate,
we could also use steganography [5] to reveal the information to Frank, again
only assuming standard cryptographic assumptions and that the observers have
bounded computational power.
However, we assume that the observers have unbounded computational power,
and that the observers see all messages sent. In that case, we could let every
person sent random messages. People who knows the secret, X , could make
their message correlated with X . For example the messages could be “I think
X belongs to the set S”. However, every time you make a correct hint about
what the secret X is, it will increase the observers suspicion that you know
X . The more precise the hint is or the more unlikely it is that you would give
the hint without knowing X , the more useful the statement is to Frank. But
at the same time, such statements would also be the statements that increases
Eve suspicion towards you the most (at least if we assume she knows X). Our
main contribution is to introduce a measure of suspicion that captures this, and
to show that if you want to leak some amount of information about X in the
information theoretical sense, then your suspicion will, in expectation, have to
increase by exactly the same amount.
The measure of suspicion turns out the be extremely useful for showing
upper bounds on how much information you can leak, without making it clear
that you are leaking. We show that if n people are known to each know X
with probability b independently of each other, and no one wants an observer to
assign probability more than c to the event that they were leaking information,
they can each leak at most −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
bits about X . Using Shannon’s
Coding Theorem, we show that for all ǫ > 0 there exists n such that if X
is uniformly distributed with entropy
(
−b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
− ǫ
)
n then n such
people can communicate in a way that would enable an observer to guess X
with probability > 1 − ǫ, but for each person, the observer would still assign
probability ≤ c to the event that that person was leaking. We show a similar
result for the case where the total number of leakers is fixed and known.
The measure of suspicion is also useful for analysing a generalisation of the
original cryptogenography (hidden-origin-writing) problem, as introduced in [2].
2
Here the authors considered a game where one person among n was randomly
chosen and given the result of a coin flip. The goal for the n players is to
communicate in such a way that an observer, Frank, would guess the correct
result of the coin flip, but another observer, Eve, who has the same information
would guess wrong, when asked who of the n originally knew the result of
the coin flip. The main method in [2] is a concavity characterisation, and is
very different from the information theory methods we use. We generalise the
problem to h bits of information and more players l who have the information,
and show that if h = o(l) the winning probability tends to 1 and if l = o(h) the
winning probability tends to 0.
Finally we show that in general to do cryptogenography, you do not need
the non-leakers to collaborate. Instead we can use the fact that people send
out random messages anyway, and use this in a similar way to steganography
(see [5]). All we need is that people are communicating in a way that involve
sufficiently randomness and that they do not change this communication, when
we build a protocol on top of that. We can for example assume that they are
not aware of the protocol, or they do not care about the leakage.
1.2 Paper Outline
We define notation and recall some concepts and theorems from information
theory and introduce a communication model in Section 2. In Section 3 we
introduce a measure of suspicion and use this to show upper bounds on how
much information the players can leak if they want Eve to have reasonable
doubt that they are leaking. In Section 4 we turn to reliable leakage, and
define and determine the capacity for some cryptogenography problems. In
Section 5 we show how our results can be used to analyse a generalisation of
the original cryptogenography problem. Finally, in Section 6 we show that we
can do equally well, even if the non-leakers are not collaborating in leaking, but
are just communicating innocently.
2 Preliminaries
Unless stated otherwise, all random variables in this paper are assumed to be
discrete. Random variables are denoted by capital letters and their support are
denoted by the calligraphic version of the same letter (e.g. X is the support of
X). If X and Y are random variables and Pr(Y = y) > 0, we let X |Y=y denote
the random variable X conditioned on Y = y. That is
Pr(X |Y=y = x) = Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(Y = y)
.
For a tuple or infinite sequence a, we let ai denote the i’th element of a, and let
ai = (a1, . . . , ai) be the tuple of the i first elements from a. Similarly if A is a
tuple or sequence of random variables. For a tuple a of n elements we let a ◦ a′
denote the tuple (a1, . . . , an, a
′).
For a random variable X and a value x ∈ X with Pr(X = x) > 0 the
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surprisal or the code-length1 of x is given by
− log(Pr(X = x)),
where log, as in the rest of this paper, is the base-2 logarithm.
The entropy of X , H(X), is the expected code-length of X
H(X) =E− log(Pr(X = x))
=−
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x) log(Pr(X = x)),
where we define 0 log(0) = 0. If p, q : X → [0, 1] are two probability distributions
on X we have the inequality
−
∑
x∈X
p(x) log(p(x)) ≤ −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log(q(x)), (1)
with equality if and only if p = q [3]. The interpretation is, if X ’s distribution is
given by p, and you encode values ofX using a code optimised to the distribution
q, you get the shortest average code-length if and only if p = q.
The entropy of a random variable X can be thought of as the uncertainty
about X , or as the amount of information in X . For a tuple of random variables
(X1, . . . Xk) the entropy H(X1, . . .Xk) is simply the entropy of the random
variable (X1, . . . , Xk). The entropy of X given Y , H(X |Y ) is
H(X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
Pr(Y = y)H(X |Y=y). (2)
A simple computation shows that
H(X |Y ) =H(X,Y )−H(Y ).
The mutual information I(X ;Y ) of two random variables X,Y is given by
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
This is known to be non-negative. The mutual information I(X ;Y |Z = z) of
X and Y given Z = z is given by
I(X ;Y |Z = z) = I(X |Z=z;Y |Z=z),
where the joint distribution of (X |Z=z, Y |Z=z) is given by (X,Y )|Z=z . The
mutual information I(X ;Y |Z) of X and Y given Z is
I(X ;Y |Z = z) = EzI(X ;Y |Z = z).
A simple computation shows that
I(X ;Y |Z) = H(X,Z) +H(Y, Z)−H(X,Y, Z)−H(Z).
1If − log(Pr(X = x)) is an integer for all x ∈ X , and we want to find an optimal prefix-free
binary code for X, the length of the code for x should be − log(Pr(X = x)), thus the name
code-length. If they are not integers, we can instead use ⌈− log(Pr(X = x))⌉ and waste at
most one bit.
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We will need the chain rule for mutual information,
I(X ; (T1, . . . Tk)) =
k∑
i=1
I(X ;Ti|(T1, . . . , Ti−1)).
Let X and Y be random variables, and f : Y → X a function. We think of f(Y )
as a guess about what X is. The probability of error, Pe is now Pr(f(Y ) 6= X).
We will need (a weak version of) Fano’s inequality,
Pe ≥ H(X |Y )− 1
log(|X |) . (3)
A discrete memoryless channel (or channel for short) q consist of a finite input
set Y, a finite output set Z and for each element y ∈ Y of the input set a
probability distribution q(z|y) on the output set. If Alice have some information
X that she wants Bob to know, she can use a channel. To do that, Alice and
Bob will have to both know a code. An error correcting code, or simply a code,
C : X → Yn is a function that for each x ∈ X specifies what Alice should give
as input to the channel. Here n is the length of the code. Now the probability
that Bob receive ZC = z1 . . . zn when X = x is given by
Pr(ZC = z|X = x) =
n∏
i=1
q (zi|C(x)i) .
When Bob knows q, C and the distribution of X he can compute Pr(X = x|ZC =
z). Let Xˆ denote the most likely value of X given ZC. A rate R is achievable
if for all ǫ > 0 there is a n > 0 such that for X uniformly distributed on
{1, . . . , 2⌈Rn⌉} there is a code C of length n for q giving Pr(Xˆ = x|X = x) > 1−ǫ
for all x ∈ X .
For a distribution p on the input set Y we get a joint distribution of (Y, Z)
given by Pr(Y = y, Z = z) = p(y)q(z|y). Now define the capacity C of q to be
C = max
p
I(Y ;Z),
where max is over all distributions p of Y and the joint distribution of (Y, Z)
is as above. Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem says that any rate below C is
achievable, and no rate above C is achievable [8]. For an introduction to these
information theoretical concepts and for proofs, see [3].
2.1 Model
In this paper we consider problems where one or more players might be trying
to leak information about the outcome of a random variable X . The number of
players is denoted n and the players are called plr1, . . . , plrn. Sometimes we
will call plr1 Alice and plr2 Bob. We let Li be the random variable that is 1
if player i knows the information and 0 otherwise. If there is only one player
we write L instead of L1. The joint distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is known to
everyone.
All messages are broadcasted to all players and to two observers, Eve and
Frank. The two observers will have exactly the same information, but we will
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think of them as two people rather than one. We want to reveal information
about X to Frank, while at the same time make sure that for all i, Eve does
not get too sure that Li = 1. The random variable that is the transcript of
a protocol will be denoted T , and specific transcripts t. This is a tuple of
messages, so we can use the notation T k, Tk, t
k, tk as define in the beginning of
this section. For example, T k denotes the tuple of the first k messages.
In this section we define the collaborating model. In Section 6 we will define
a model, were we do not need the non-leakers to collaborate. The model in
Section 6 will be more useful in practice, however when constructing protocols,
it is easier first to construct them in the collaboration model. In the collaborating
model we can tell all the players including the non-leaking players to follow some
communication protocol, called a collaborating cryptogenography protocol. The
messages send by leaking player may depend on the value ofX , but the messages
of non-leaking players have to be independent ofX given the previous transcript.
Formally, a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π specifies for any possible
value tk of the current transcript T k:
• Should the communication stop or continue, and if it should continue,
• Who is next to send a message, say plri, and
• A distribution p? and a set of distributions, {px}x∈X (the distributions p?
and {px}x∈X depend on π and tk). Now plri should choose a message
using p?, if Li = 0 and choose a message using px if L = 1 and X = x.
Furthermore, for any protocol π, there should a number length(π) such that the
protocol will always terminate after at most length(π) messages. We assume
that both Frank and Eve know the protocol. They also know the prior distribu-
tion of (X,L1, . . . , Ln), and we assume that they have computational power to
compute (X,L1, . . . , Ln)|T=t for any transcript t. Notice that this assumption
rules out the use of cryptography.
One way that everyone can know the protocol, is if one person, e.g. Frank,
announces the protocol that they will use, and we assume that everyone follows
that protocol. Another possibility is that the players and Frank and Eve (or
their ancestors) have played a game about leaking information many times and
slowly developed (or evolved) a protocol for leaking information and learned
(or evolved) to play the game optimally. In this paper we will not consider the
question of if and how the protocol could be developed or evolved.
While we think of different players as different people, two or more differ-
ent players could be controlled by the same person. For example, if they are
communicating in a chatroom with perfect anonymity, except that a profile’s
identity will be revealed if the profile can be shown to be guilty in leaking with
probability > 95%. Here each player would correspond to a profile, but the same
person could have more profiles. However, we will use “player” and “person” as
synonyms in the paper.
3 Bounds on I(X; T )
3.1 Suspicion
First we will look at the problem where only one player is communicating and
she may or may not be trying to leak information. We will later use these results
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when we analyse the many-player problem.
In the one player case, Alice sends one message A. If she is not trying to leak
information, she will choose this message in A randomly using a distribution
p?. If she is trying to leak information, and X = x, she will use a distribution
px. For a random variable Y and a value y ∈ Y with Pr(Y = y) > 0 we let
cY=y = Pr(L = 1|Y = y). We usually suppress the random variable, and write
cy instead. Here Y could be a tuple of random variables, and y a tuple of values.
If y = (y1, y2) is a tuple, we write cy1y2 instead of c(y1,y2).
We want to see how much information Alice can leak to Frank (by choosing
the p’s), without being too suspicious to Eve. The following measure of suspicion
turns out to be useful.
Definition 1. Let Y be a random variable jointly distributed with L. Then
the suspicion (of Alice) given Y = y is
susp(Y = y) =− log(1− cy)
=− log(Pr(L = 0|Y = y)).
We see that susp(Y = y) depends on y and the joint distribution of L and Y ,
but to keep notation simple, we suppress the dependence on L. The suspicion
of Alice measures how suspicious Alice is to someone who knows that Y = y
and knows nothing more. For example Y could be the tuple that consists of the
secret information X and the current transcript.
We can think of the suspicion as the surprisal of the event, “Alice did not
have the information”. Next we define the suspicion given a random variable
Y , without setting it equal to something.
Definition 2. The suspicion (of Alice) given Y is
susp(Y ) =Eysusp(Y = y)
=
∑
y∈Y
Pr(Y = y)susp(Y = y). (4)
In each of these, Y can consist of more than one random variable, e.g. Y =
(X,A). Finally we can also combine these two definitions, giving
susp(X,A = a) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x|A = a)susp((X,A) = (x, a)).
Where X and A can themselves be tuples of random variables.
The definitions imply that
susp(X,A) =
∑
a∈A
Pr(A = a)susp(X,A = a),
which can be thought of as (4) given X .
When Alice sends a message A this might reveal some information about
X , but at the same time, she will also reveal some information about whether
she is trying to leak X . We would like to bound I(A;X) by the information A
reveals about L. This is not possible. If, for example, we set A = X whenever
L = 1 and A = a 6∈ X when L = 0, then I(A;X) = Pr(L = 1)H(A) which
can be large, but I(A;L) ≤ H(L) ≤ 1. The theorem below shows that instead,
I(A;X) can be bounded by the expected increase in suspicion given X , and
that this bound is tight.
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Theorem 1. If Alice sends a message A, we have
I(X ;A) ≤ susp(X,A)− susp(X).
That is, the amount of information she sends about X is at most her expected
increase in suspicion given X. There is equality if and only if the distribution
of A is the same as A|L=0.
Proof. With no information revealed, Alice’s suspicion given X is
susp(X) = −
∑
x∈X
Pr(X = x) log(1− cx).
We want to compute Alice’s suspicion given X and her message A.
susp(X,A) =
∑
x,j
Pr(X = x,A = a)susp(X = x,A = a)
=−
∑
x,a
Pr(X = x,A = a) log(1− cxa)
=−
∑
x,a
Pr(X = x,A = a)
(
log(1− cx) + log
(
1− cxa
1− cx
))
.
Now it follows that the cost in suspicion given X of sending A is
susp(X,A)− susp(X) = −
∑
x,j
Pr(X = x,A = a) log
(
1− cxa
1− cx
)
. (5)
Next we want to see how much informationA gives aboutX , that is I(A;X) =
H(A) − H(A|X). We claim that this is bounded by the cost in suspicion,
or equivalently, H(A) ≤ susp(X,A) − susp(X) + H(A|X). First we compute
H(A|X) using (2):
H(A|X) =
∑
x
Pr(X = x)H(A|X = x)
=−
∑
x
Pr(X = x)
∑
a
Pr(A = a|X = x) log(Pr(A = a|X = x))
=−
∑
x,a
Pr(X = x,A = a) log(Pr(A = a|X = x)). (6)
We have
1− cxa
1− cx Pr(A = a|X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0|X = x,A = a)
Pr(L = 0|X = x) Pr(A = a|X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0, X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x)
Pr(L = 0, X = x)
Pr(X = x,A = a)
Pr(X = x)
=
Pr(L = 0, X = x,A = a)
Pr(L = 0, X = x)
=Pr(A = a|X = x, L = 0)
=Pr(A = a|L = 0) (7)
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Here, the last equation follows from the assumption that A does not depend on
X when L = 0. From this we conclude
susp(X,A)− susp(X) +H(A|X)
=−
∑
x,a
Pr(X = x,A = a) log
(
1− cxa
1− cx Pr(A = a|X = x)
)
=−
∑
x,a
Pr(X = x,A = a) log (Pr(A = a|L = 0))
=−
∑
a
Pr(A = a) log (Pr(A = a|L = 0))
≥−
∑
a
Pr(A = a) log(Pr(A = a))
=H(A).
Here the first equality follows from (5) and (6), the second follows from (7)
and the inequality follows from inequality (1). There is equality if and only if
Pr(A = a) = Pr(A = a|L = 0) for all a.
We will now turn to the problem where many people are communicating.
We assume that they sent messages one at a time, so we can break the protocol
into time periods were only one person is communicating, and see the entire
protocol as a sequence of one player protocols. The following Corollary show
that a statement similar to Theorem 1 holds for each single message in a protocol
with many players.
Corollary 2. Let (L, T k−1, X) have some joint distribution, where T k−1 de-
notes previous transcript. Let Tk be the next message sent by Alice. Then
I(X ;Tk|T k−1) ≤ susp(X,T k)− susp(X,T k−1).
Proof. For a particular value tk−1 of T k−1 we use Theorem 1 with (X,Tk)|Tk−1=tk−1
as (X,A) to get
I(X ;Tk|T k−1 = tk−1) ≤ susp(X,Tk, T k−1 = tk−1)− susp(X,T k−1 = tk−1).
By multiplying each side by Pr(T k−1 = tk−1) and summing over all possible
T k−1 we get the desired inequality.
A protocol consists of a sequence of messages that each leaks some infor-
mation and increases the suspicion of the sender. We can add up increases
in suspicion, and using the chain rule for mutual information we can also add
up the amount of revealed information. However, we have to be aware that
Bob’s message not only affect his own suspicion, but it might also affect Alice’s
suspicion. To show an upper bound on the amount of information a group of
people can leak, we need to show that one persons message will, in expectation,
never make another persons suspicion decrease. We get this from the following
proposition by setting Y = (X,T k−1) and B = Tk.
Proposition 3. For any joint distribution on (L, Y,B) we have susp(Y ) ≤
susp(Y,B).
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Proof. We have
susp(Y = y) =− log(Pr(L = 0|Y = y))
=− log
(∑
b∈B
Pr(B = b|Y = y) Pr(L = 0|Y = y,B = b)
)
susp(Y = y,B) =−
∑
b∈B
Pr(B = b|Y = y) log Pr(L = 0|Y = y,B = b).
(8)
As p 7→ − log(p) is convex, Jensen’s inequality gives us
susp(Y = y,B) ≥ susp(Y = y).
Multiplying each side by Pr(Y = y) and summing over all y ∈ Y gives us the
desired inequality.
In the proof of the next theorem we will assume that the protocol runs for
a fixed number of messages, and the player to talk in round k only depends on
k, not on which previous messages was send. Any protocol π can be turned
into such a protocol π′ by adding dummy messages: In round k of π′ we let
plrk mod n talk. They follow protocol π in the sense that if it is not plrk mod n
turn to talk according to π she send some fixed message 1, and if it is her turn,
she chooses her message as in π.
Let suspi denote the suspicion of plri.
2
Theorem 4. If T is the transcript of the entire protocol we have
I(X ;T ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(suspi(X,T )− suspi(X)) .
Proof. From the chain rule for mutual information, we know that
I(X ;T ) =
length(π)∑
k=1
I(X ;Tk|T k−1).
Now Corollary 2 shows that I(X ;Tk|T k−1) ≤ suspi(X,T k) − suspi(X,T k−1)
if plri send the kth message and Proposition 3 shows that suspi′(X,T
k) ≥
suspi′(X,T
k−1) for all other i′. Summing over all rounds in the protocol, we
get the theorem.
3.2 Keeping reasonable doubt
Until now we have bounded the amount of information the players can leak
by the expected increase in some strange measure, suspicion, that we defined
for the purpose. But there is no reason to think that someone who is leaking
information cares about the expected suspicion towards her afterwards. A more
likely scenario, is that each person leaking wants to ensure that after the leakage,
an observer will assign probability at most c to the event that she was leaking
2This is defined similar to the suspicion of Alice, except using Li instead of L.
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information. If this is the case after all possible transcripts t, we see that
suspi(X,T ) ≤ − log(1 − c). If we assume that each player before the protocol
had probability b < c of leaking independently of X , that is Pr(Li|X = x) = b
for all x and i, we have suspi(X) = − log(1− b). Thus
I(X ;T ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(suspi(X,T )− suspi(X)) = (log(1− c) + log(1− b))n. (9)
To reach this bound, we would need to have Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) = c for
all x, t, i. But the probability Pr(Li = 1|X = x) = b can also be computed as
Et Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t), so Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) cannot be constantly
c > b. The following theorem improves the upper bound from (9) by taking this
into account.
Theorem 5. Let π be a collaborating cryptogenography protocol, and T be its
transcript. If for all players plri and all x ∈ X and all transcripts t we have
Pr(Li = 1|X = x) = b, and Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c then
I(X ;T ) ≤ −b log(1− c) + c log(1− b)
c
n.
Proof. If Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) ≤ c then
suspi(X = x, T = t) =− log(1− Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t))
≤− log(1− c)
c
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t). (10)
This follows from the fact that we have equality when Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t)
is 0 or c, and the left hand side is convex in Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t) while the
right hand side is linear.
Let π and T be as in the assumptions. Now we get
suspi(X,T ) =
∑
x,t
Pr(X = x, T = t)suspi(X = x, T = t)
≤
∑
x,t
Pr(X = x, T = t)
− log(1− c)
c
Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T = t)
=
∑
x,t
− log(1 − c)
c
Pr(Li = 1, X = x, T = t)
=
− log(1− c)
c
Pr(Li = 1)
=
−b log(1 − c)
c
.
Thus
I(X ;T ) ≤
n∑
i=1
(suspi(X,T )− suspi(X))
≤
(−b log(1 − c)
c
− (− log(1 − b))
)
n
=
−b log(1 − c) + c log(1 − b)
c
n.
11
It is clear that the upper bound from Theorem 5 cannot be achieved for all
distributions of (X,L1, . . . , Ln). If for example H(X) <
−b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
n
we must also have I(X,T ) ≤ H(X) < −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
n, that is, the players
do not have enough information to send to reach the upper bound. Even if
H(X) is high, we may not be able to reach the upper bound. If it is known that
L1 = L2 = · · · = Ln the suspicion of the players will not depend on the player,
only on the messages sent. So this problem will be equivalent to the case where
only one person is sending messages.
We will now give an example where the upper bound from Theorem 5 is
achievable. We will refer back to this example when we prove that reliable
leakage is possible.
Example 1. Assume that X,L1, . . . , Ln are all independent, and Pr(Li = 1) = b
for all i. Furthermore, assume that 0 < b < c < 1 and that b(1−c)
c(1−b) is a rational
number. Let d, a ∈ N be the smallest natural numbers such that a
d
= b(1−c)
c(1−b) .
We see that b(1−c)
c(1−b) ∈ (0, 1) so 0 < a < d. We will assume that X is uniformly
distributed on {1, . . . , d}n.
Each player plri now sends one message, independently of which messages
the other players send. If Li = 0, plri chooses a message in {1, . . . , d} uniformly
at random. If Li = 1 and Xi = xi, then plri chooses a message in
{1 + (xi − 1)a, 2 + (xi − 1)a . . . , xia} mod d
uniformly at random.3
We see that over random choice of X , the message, Ai, that plri sends, is
uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , d}, so H(Ai) = log(d). We want to compute
H(Ai|X). Given X , each of the d − a elements not in {1 + (xi − 1)a, 2 +
(xi − 1)a . . . , xia} mod d can only be send if L = 0, so they will be send with
probability 1−b
d
. Each of the a elements in the set {1 + (xi − 1)a, 2 + (xi −
1)a . . . , xia} mod d are sent with probability ba + 1−bd . Thus
H(Ai|X) =−
∑
ti∈Ai
Pr(Ai = ti) log(Pr(Ai = ti))
=− a
(
b
a
+
1− b
d
)
log
(
b
a
+
1− b
d
)
− (d− a)1− b
d
log
(
1− b
d
)
=− b
c
log
(
1− b
d(1 − c)
)
−
(
1− b
c
)
log
(
1− b
d
)
.
The last equality follows from three uses of a
d
= b(1−c)
c(1−b) , or of its equivalent
formulation, b
a
+ 1−b
d
= b
ac
. Now
I(Ai;X) =H(Ai)−H(Ai|X)
= log(d) +
b
c
log
(
1− b
d(1− c)
)
+
(
1− b
c
)
log
(
1− b
d
)
= log(1− b)− b
c
log(1 − c)
=
−b log(1− c) + c log(1− b)
c
. (11)
3We use k mod d to mean the number in {1, . . . d} that is equal to k modulo d.
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The tuples (Xi, Ai, Li) where i ranges over {1, . . . n} are independent from each
other, so we have I(T ;X) = −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
n as wanted.
Next we want to compute Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x). This is 0 if plri send a
message not in {1 + (xi − 1)a, 2 + (xi − 1)a . . . , xia} mod d. Otherwise we use
independence and then Bayes’ Theorem to get
Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) =Pr(Li = 1|Ai = ti, Xi = xi)
=
Pr(Ai = ti|Li = 1, Xi = xi) Pr(Li = 1|Xi = xi)
Pr(Ai = ti|Xi = xi)
=
1
a
b
b
a
+ 1−b
d
=
b
a
b
ac
=c. (12)
As we wanted.
4 Reliable leakage
In the previous example, Frank would receive some information about X in the
sense of information theory: Before he sees the transcript, any value of X would
be as likely as any other value, and when he knows the transcript, he has a
much better idea about what X is. However, his best guess about what X is,
is still very unlikely to be correct. Next we want to show that we can have
reliable leakage. That is, no matter what value X is taking, we want Frank to
be able to guess the correct value with high probability. We will see that this
is possible, even when X have entropy close to −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
n. Frank’s
guess would have to be a function D of the transcript t. Saying that Frank will
guess X correct with high probability when X = x is that same as saying that
Pr(D(T ) = x|X = x) is close to one.
Definition 3. Let L = (L1, . . . , Ln) be a tuple of random variables, where the
Li takes values in {0, 1}.
A risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol is a collaborating cryptogenography proto-
col together with a function D from the set of possible transcripts to X =
{1, . . . , 2⌈h⌉} such that when X and L are distributed independently and X is
uniformly distributed on X , then for any x ∈ X , there is probability 1− ǫ that
a random transcript t distributed as T |X=x satisfies
• ∀i : Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c, and
• D(t) = x
That is, no matter the value of X , with high probability Frank can guess
the value of X , and with high probability no player will be estimated to have
leaked the information with probability > c by Eve. However, there might be a
small risk that someone will be estimated to have leaked the information with
probability > c. This is the reason we call it a risky protocol. A safe protocol
is a protocol where this never happens.
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Definition 4. A safe (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol is a risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol where
Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c for all i, t, x with Pr(T = t,X = x) > 0.
First we will consider the case where L1, . . . , Ln are independent, and the
Li’s all have the same distribution.
Definition 5. Let Indepb(n) be the random variable (L1, . . . , Ln) where L1, . . . , Ln
are independent, and each Li is distributed on {0, 1} and Pr(L1 = 1) = b.
A rate R is safely/riskily c-achievable for Indepb if for all ǫ > 0 and all n0,
there exists a safe/risky (n, nR, Indepb(n), c, ǫ)-protocol with n ≥ n0.
The safe/risky c-capacity for Indepb is the supremum of all safely/riskily
c-achievable rates for Indepb.
It turns out that the safe and the risky c-capacities for Indepb are the same,
but at the moment we will only consider the safe capacity.
Proposition 6. No rate R > −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
is safely c-achievable for
Indepb.
Proof. Assume for contradiction thatR > −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
is safely c-achievable
for Indepb, and let π be a safe (n,Rn, Indepb(n), c, ǫ)-protocol. Let δ = R −
−b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
. We know from Theorem 5 that
I(X ;T ) ≤ −b log(1− c) + c log(1− b)
c
n = (R− δ)n.
Now
H(X |T ) = H(X)− I(X ;T ) ≥ Rn− (R− δ)n = δn.
By Fano’s inequality (3) we get that the probability of error for Frank’s guess
is
Pe ≥ δn− 1
nR
.
Thus for sufficiently large n0 and sufficiently small ǫ we cannot have Pe ≤ ǫ.
When Pe > ǫ there must exist an x ∈ X such that Pr(D(T ) 6= x|X = x) > ǫ, so
R is not safely c-achievable.
Next we want to show that all rates R < −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
are safely c-
achievable for Indepb. To do this, we can consider each person to be a usage of
a channel, and use Shannon’s Noisy-Channel Theorem.
Theorem 7. Any rate R < −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
is safely c-achievable for Indepb.
Proof. Let R < −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
and let c′ ≤ c be a number such that b(1−c′)
c′(1−b)
is rational and R < −b log(1−c
′)+c′ log(1−b)
c′
. Now use b and c′ to define a and d as
in Example 1. We consider the channel that on input j with probability b re-
turns a random uniformly distributed element in {1+(j−1)a, 2+(j−1)a . . . , ja}
mod d, and with probability 1 − b it returns a random and uniformly dis-
tributed element in {1, . . . , d}. We see that each person sending a message,
exactly corresponds to using this channel. The computation (11) from Example
1 shows that when input of this channel is uniformly distributed, the mutual
information between input and output is −b log(1−c
′)+c′ log(1−b)
c′
. Thus the ca-
pacity of the channel is at least this value (in fact, it is this value). We now
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use Shannon’s Noisy-Channel Coding Theorem [8, 3] to get an error correct-
ing code C : X → {1, . . . , d}n for this channel, that achieves rate R and for
each x fails with probability < ǫ. Now when X = x any player that is not
leaking will send a message chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , d} and
any player plri with Li = 1 chooses a message uniformly at random from
{1 + (j − 1)a, 2 + (j − 2)a, . . . , ja} mod d, where j = C(x)i is the i’th letter
in the codeword for x. This ensures that Frank will be able to guess x with
probability 1 − ǫ. We see that given X the random variable (Ai, Li), is inde-
pendent from A1, L1, . . . , Ai−1, Li−1, Ai+1, Li+1, . . . , An, Ln. Using the compu-
tation from (12) we now get that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) is either 0 or c′ ≤ c
as needed.
For a specific code C, the message Ai send by plri may not be uniform,
as some letters might occur more often than others as the i’th letter in C(X).
On the other hand, given Li = 0, we know that Ai is uniformly distributed,
and Theorem 1 then implies that the expected increases in suspicion will be
strictly greater than the leaked information. The computation (12) shows that
the expected increases in suspicion is the same no matter the distribution of Ci,
but of course the amount of leaked information is greatest when Ci is uniformly
distributed.
Corollary 8. The safe c-capacity for Indepb is
−b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 6 and Theorem 7.
Corollary 8 shows that if you want information about something that some
proportion b of the population knows, but no one wants other people to think
that they know it with probability > c, you can still get information about the
subject, and at a rate of −b log(1−c)+c log(1−b)
c
bits per person you ask. What if
only l persons in the world have the information? They are allowed to blend
into a group of any size n, and observers will think that any person in the larger
group is as likely as anyone else to have the information. Only the number of
persons with the information is known to everyone.
If they are part of a group of n→∞ people, then each person in the larger
group would have the information with probability b = l
n
. If we forget that
exactly l persons know the information, and instead assumed that all the Lis
were independent with Pr(Li = 1) = b they would be able to leak
−b log(1− c) + c log(1− b)
c
n =
− l
n
log(1− c) + c log(1− l
n
)
c
n
→
(
log(1− c)
c
− log(e)
)
l
bits of information, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. We will see
that even in the case where the number of leakers is known and constant, we
can still get this rate. First we define the distribution of (L1, . . . , Ln) that we
get in this case.
Definition 6. Let Fixed(l, n) be the random variable (L1, . . . , Ln) that is dis-
tributed such that the set of leakers {plri|Li = 1} is uniformly distributed over
all subsets of {plr1, . . . , plrn} of size l.
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A rate R is safely/riskily c-achievable for Fixed if for all ǫ > 0 and all l0,
there exists a safe/risky (n, lR,Fixed(l, n), c, ǫ)-protocol for some l ≥ l0 and
some n.
The safe/risky c-capacity for Fixed is the supremum of all safely/riskily c-
achievable rates for Fixed.
Notice that in this definition, the rate is measured in bits per leaker rather
than bits per person communicating. That is because in this setup we assume
that the number of people with the information is the bounded resource, and
that they can find an arbitrarily large group of person to hide in.
Again, it turns out that the safe and the risky c-capacity for Fixed are actu-
ally the same, but for the proofs it will be convenient to have both definitions.
Proposition 9. No rate R > − log(1−c)
c
− log(e), where e is the base of the
natural logarithm is safely c-achievable for Fixed.
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 6.
Assume for contradiction that R > − log(1−c)
c
− log(e) is safely c-achievable.
Consider a safe (n, lR,Fixed(l, n), c, ǫ)-protocol π. We know from Theorem 5
that
I(X ;T ) ≤ −
l
n
log(1 − c) + c log (1− l
n
)
c
n ≤ l
(− log(1− c)
c
− log(e)
)
.
Here the second inequality follows from ln(1+x) ≤ x or equivalently log(1+x) ≤
x
ln(2) = −x log(e). Let δ := R− − log(1−c)c − log(e). Now
H(X |T ) = H(X)− I(X ;T ) ≥ l
(
R− − log(1− c)
c
− log(e)
)
= lδ.
By Fano’s inequality we get that the probability of error, Pe = Pr(D(t) 6= x)
averages over all possible values of x is
Pe ≥ lδ − 1
lR
.
Thus if we chose l0 sufficiently large and ǫ sufficiently small we cannot have
l ≥ l0 and Pe ≤ ǫ, so that there must be some value x where the probability of
error Pr(D(T ) 6= x|X = x) is greater than ǫ.
Theorem 10. Any rate R < − log(1−c)
c
− log(e) is riskily c-achievable for Fixed.
One way, and in the author’s opinion the most illuminating way, to prove
this is similar to the proof of Theorem 7. Again we would consider each player
to be a use of a channel. However, in this case the different usages of the channel
would not be independent as we know exactly how many people who are leaking.
Intuitively, this should not be a problem, it should only make the channel more
reliable. However to show that this work, we would have to go through the
proof of Shannon Noisy-Channel Coding Theorem, and show that it still works.
Instead we will give a shorter but less natural proof.
The idea is to use the same protocol as when we showed the lower bound in
Theorem 7. However, for each particular rate R and number of player n, there
is a small probability that Frank fail to guess X . The probability that exactly
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bn players are leaking, when all the Li’s are independent tends to 0 as n tends
to infinity, so we could be unlucky that Frank often fais in this case. Instead of
using the protocol from Theorem 7 on all the players, we divide the player onto
two groups and use Theorem 7 on each group.
Proof. Let R < − log(1−c)
c
− log(e), then we can find rational b > 0 and rational
c′ < c such that R < −b log(1−c
′)+c′ log(1−b)
bc′
, and let n0, ǫ > 0 be given. By
Theorem 7 for any ǫ′ > 0 and any n′0 there exists a safe (n, nR, Indepb(n), c
′, ǫ′)-
protocol where n > n′0. Take such a protocol, where ǫ
′ > 0 is sufficiently small
and n′0 is sufficiently large. We can also assume that bn is an integer.
Now we will use this to make a risky (2n, 2⌈nR⌉,Fixed(2nb), c, ǫ)-protocol.
For such a protocol, X should be uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 22⌈nR⌉}, but
instead we can also think of X as a tuple (X1, X2) where the Xi are independent
and each Xi is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 2⌈nR⌉}. Now we split the 2n
persons into two groups of n, and let the first group use the protocol from the
proof of Theorem 7 to leak X1, and the second group use the same protocol to
leak X2. We let Franks guess of the value of X1 be a function D1 depending
only of the transcript of the communication of the first group, and his guess
of X2 be a function D2 depending only on the transcript of the second group.
These functions are the same as D in the proof of Theorem 7. The total number
of leakers is 2nb, but the number of leakers in each half varies. Let SIndep denote
random variable that gives the number of leakers among n people, when each is
leaking with probability b, independently of each other. So SIndep is binomially
distributed, SIndep ∼ B(n, b). Let SFixed,1 denote the number of leakers in the
first group as chosen above. Now we have.
Lemma 11. For each k,
Pr(SFixed,1 = k)
Pr(SIndep = k)
≤ 2.
Proof. We have
Pr(SFixed,1 = k) =
(
2l
k
)(
2n−2l
n−k
)
(
2n
n
) .
A simple computation shows
Pr(SFixed,1 = k) Pr(SIndep = k + 1)
Pr(SIndep = k) Pr(SFixed,1 = k + 1)
=
n− 2l+ k + 1
2l− k
l
n− l ,
which is > 1 for k ≥ l and < 1 for k < l. Thus for fixed n and l the ratio
Pr(SFixed,1=k)
Pr(SIndep=k)
is maximized by k = l. Using Sterlings formula,
1 ≤ n!√
2πn
(
n
e
)n ≤ e√
2π
we get
Pr(SFixed,1 = l)
Pr(SIndep = l)
=
(
2l
l
)(
2n−2l
n−l
)
nn(
2n
n
)(
n
l
)
ll(n− l)n−l
≤
√
2
(
e√
2π
)3
<2.
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Given that SIndep = k = SFixed,1, the distribution on (L1, . . . , Ln) and tran-
script is the same in the protocol for Indepb as it is for the first group in the
above protocol. As Franks guessing function is the same in the two cases, the
probability of error given SIndep = k = SFixed,1 is the same in the two proto-
cols. Let Ek denote the probability of error in the protocol for Indepb given
SIndep = k, and let EFixed,1 denote the probability that Franks guess of X1 is
wrong.
EFixed,1 =
n∑
k=1
Pr(SFixed,1 = k)Ek
≤
n∑
k=1
2Pr(SIndep = k)Ek
≤2ǫ′.
By the same argument, the probability that Frank guess X2 wrong is at most
2ǫ′, so the probability that he guess X = (X1, X2) is at most 4ǫ
′. By choosing
a sufficiently low ǫ′ this is less than ǫ/2
To compute the posterior probability Pr(Li = 1|T = t) that plri was leak-
ing, we have to take the entire transcript from both groups into account. Given
T and X , let K denote the set of players who sent a message consistent with
knowing X , and let |K| denote the cardinality of K. Let S be the set of the 2l
leaking players, and let s be a set of 2l players. Now
Pr(S = s|X = x, T = t) = Pr(T = t|S = s,X = x) Pr(S = s|X = x)
P (T = t|X = x) .
This is 0 if s contains players who send a message not consistent with having the
information, and is constant for all other s. Thus any two players who send a
message consistent with having the information, are equally likely to have known
X given T andX , so they will have Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) = 2l|K| . So to ensure
that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c with high probability (for each x and random
t) we only need to ensure that with high probability, |K| ≥ 2l
c
. We see that
|K| = 2l + B
(
2n− 2l, b(1−c′)
c′(1−b)
)
, which have expectation 2l+ (2n− 2l) b(1−c′)
c′(1−b) =
2l
c′
= 2l
c
+ 2l c−c
′
cc′
. We also see that the variance is (2n − 2l)b(1 − b), so for
sufficiently high n (and thus l) Chebyshev’s inequality, shows that |K| ≥ 2l
c
with probability 1 − ǫ/2. Thus for sufficiently large n′0 and sufficiently low ǫ′,
the resulting protocol is a risky (2n, 2⌈nR⌉,Fixed(2nb), c, ǫ)-protocol.
4.1 General L-structures
We have shown that the safe c-capacity for Fixed is ≤ − log(1−c)
c
− log(e) ≤
the risky c-capacity Fixed. To finish the proof that they are both − log(1−c)
c
−
log(e), we only need to show that the safe capacity is not smaller than the risky.
Notice that the corresponding claim is not true if we are only interested in the
mutual information between X and transcript T . Here we could construct a
collaborating cryptography protocol where with very high probability, Pr(Li =
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1|T = t) < 10−100, and yet I(X ;T ) ≥ 10100. To do this we need to take
X to have extremely high entropy, and with a very low probability a leaking
player will send X in a message, and otherwise just send some fixed message.
The point of this section is to show that you cannot do something similar for
reliable leakage. We will prove this in a setting that generalise Indepb and Fixed.
Remember that the difference between Indepb and Fixed capacity is not only
in the distributions on (L1, . . . Ln), but also in what we are trying to minimize
the use of. In Indepb we want to have as few people communicating as possible,
while in Fixed we only care about the number of people who are leaking. Our
general definition have to capture this difference as well.
Definition 7. An L-structure (L, C) is a set L of joint distributions of (L1, . . . , Ln)
(where n do not need to be the same for each element), where each Li is dis-
tributed on {0, 1}, together with a cost function C : L→ R≥0.
Indepb is the L-structure (LIndepb , C#), where LIndepb is the set of distribu-
tions on (L1, . . . , Ln) (over n ∈ N) where for all i, Pr(Li = 1) = b and the Li are
independent, and C# is the function that sends a distribution on (L1, . . . , Ln)
to n.
Fixed is the L-structure (LFixed, CFixed) of distributions on (L1, . . . , Ln) such
that for some number l the set {plri|Li = 1} is uniformly distributed over
all subsets of {plr1, . . . , plrn} of size l, and CFixed sends a distribution on
(L1, . . . , Ln) to this number l.
For an L-structure (L, C) a rate R is safely/riskily c-achievable for (L, C) if
for all ǫ > 0 and all h0 ≥ 0 there exists a safe/riskily (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol with
h ≥ h0, h ≥ C(L)R and L ∈ L.
The safe/risky c-capacity for (L, C) is the supremum of all safely/riskily
c-achievable rates for (L, C).
We see that Definition 7 agrees with Definition 5 and Definition 6, and is
much more general.
Proposition 12. Let (L, C) be an L-structure. The safe c-capacity for (L, C)
and the risky c-capacity for (L, C) are non-decreasing functions of c.
Proof. Let c′ > c. Any safe/risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol is a safe/risky (n, h, L, c′, ǫ)-
protocol, so any safe/riskily c-achievable rate for (L, C) is a safe/riskily c′-
achievable rate for (L, C).
Proposition 13. Let (L, C) be an L-structure. The safe c-capacity for (L, C)
is at most the risky c-capacity for (L, C).
Proof. Any safe (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol is a risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol, so any
safely c-achievable rate for (L, C) is riskily c-achievable for (L, C).
The opposite inequality almost holds. Before we show that, we need a lemma.
Lemma 14. For any risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-protocol π, there is a risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-
protocol π′ where each message is either 0 or 1, and given previous transcript
and given that the person sending the message is not leaking, there is at least
probability 1/3 of the message being 0 and at least 1/3 of it being 1.
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Proof. To restrict to {0, 1} we simply send one bit at a time, so now we only
have to ensure that the probability of a message sent by a non-leaker being 0 is
always in [ 13 ,
2
3 ]. If the next message is 0 with probability p < 1/3, given that the
sender is not leaking we modify the protocol (the case where p > 2/3 is similar).
First, the player plri sending the message decides if she would have send 0 or
1 in the old protocol π. Call this message a. If a = 0 she chooses a number in
the interval (0, p) uniformly at random, if a = 1 she chooses a number in (p, 1)
uniformly at random. She then sends the bits of the number one bit at a time
until
• She says 1, or
• Given transcript until now, there is probability ≥ 13 that a = 0
In the first case we then know that a = 1, and we can go to the next round of
π. Each time plri says 0, she doubles the probability that a = 0, so if we are
in the second case (and was not before the last message), Pr(a = 0|T ) < 23 . In
this case she will simply reveal a in the next message.
Instead of choosing a real number uniformly from (0, p) or (p, 1), which would
require access to randomness with infinite entropy, plri can just in each step
compute the probabilities of sending 0 or 1 given that she had chosen such a
number. Thus if for every probability p′ every player has access to a coin that
ends head up with probability p′, they only need a finite number of coin flips to
follow the above protocol.
The following lemma almost says that the safe c-capacity for (L, C) is the
same as the risky c-capacity for (L, C).
Lemma 15. Let c′ > c. The safe c′-capacity for (L, C) is at least the same as
the risky c-capacity for (L, C).
Proof. To show this, it is enough to show that if R is a riskily c-achievable
rate for (L, C), then R is safely c′-achievable for (L, C). Let R be a riskily c-
achievable rate for (L, C), and let ǫ′ > 0 and h′0 be given. We want to show that
there exists a safe (n′, h′, L, c′, ǫ′)-protocol with h′ ≥ h′0, L ∈ L and h′ ≥ C(L)R.
As R is riskily c-achievable for (L, C), there exists a risky (n, h, L, c, ǫ)-
protocol for any ǫ > 0 and some L ∈ L, h ≥ h′0, h ≥ C(L)R and n. Let π be
such a protocol, where ǫ is a small number to be specified later.
We want to modify π to make it a safe protocol π′. First, by Lemma 14 we
can assume that all messages send in π are in {0, 1} and given that the sender
is not leaking, it has probability at least 1/3 of being 0 and at least probability
1/3 of being 1.
To ensure that for no transcript t and player plri we have Pr(Li = 1|X =
x, T = t) > c′, we modify the protocol, such that everyone starts to pretends
ignorance if the next message could result in Pr(Li = 1|X = x, T k+1 = tk+1) >
c′. Formally, we define a protocol π′ that starts of as π but if at some point
the transcript is tk and for some i and b ∈ {0, 1} we have Pr(Li = 1|T k+1 =
tk ◦ b,X = x) > c′ all the players pretends ignorance, that is for the rest of
the protocol they send messages as if they did not have the information and
were following π. Notice that only the players who knows the information x can
decide if they should pretend ignorance, but this is not a problem as the players
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who do not have the information, is already sending messages as if they did not
have the information.
First we want to show that π′ is c′-safe. As long as they do not pretend
ignorance we know that Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) ≤ c′ for the partial
transcript tk and all i. If at some point they starts to pretend ignorance,
we have Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) ≤ c′ before they start, and all mes-
sages will be chosen as if no one had the information. Eve, who knows X ,
can compute Pr(Li = 1|T k+1 = tk ◦ b,X = x) > c′ for each i and b, so she
knows if everyone is pretending ignorance. Thus, Eve does not learn anything
about L from listening to the rest of the communication, so we will still have
Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) ≤ c′ when π′ terminates.
Fix x ∈ X . We want to compute the probability that they pretends ignorance
given X = x. Let Epar,>c′ denote the event that for transcript T from the
execution of π, we can find some k and some i such that we have Pr(Li = 1|T k =
tk, X = x) > c′. That is, at some point in the execution of π, an observer would
say that plri was leaking with probability > c
′. Let Etot,>c be that event that
for the total transcript there is some i such that Pr(Li = 1|T = t,X = x) > c.
For each transcript t where Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > c′ for some k, i, we
consider that smallest k such that Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > c′ happens for
some i. For this fixed tk let T−k denote the random variable that is distributed
as the rest of the transcript given that the transcript starts with tk and X = x.
Let Stk denote the random variable
Stk = Pr(Li = 1|T = tk ◦ T−k, X = x).
That is, Stk is a function of T
−k. We see that Stk takes values in [0, 1] and
EStk = Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x) > c′ so by Markov’s inequality on 1 − Stk
we get
Pr(1 − Stk ≥ 1− c− ǫ1|X = x) ≤
E(1− Stk)
1− c− ǫ1 <
1− c′
1− c− ǫ1
for all ǫ1 > 0. Thus, given that Epar,>c′ happens, Etot,>c will happen with
probability ≥ c′−c1−c > 0. So c
′−c
1−c Pr(Epar,>c′ |X = x) ≤ Pr(Etot,>c|X = x) ≤ ǫ,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption about π.
Let Eig be the event that in the evaluation of π
′ the players pretends igno-
rance. The players only pretends ignorance if they are one message away from
making Epar,>c′ happen. We assumed that in π each possible message get sent
with probability at least 1/3 if the sender is not leaking. As there is probabil-
ity at least 1 − c′ that he is not leaking, each possible message gets sent with
probability at least ≥ 1−c′3 so 1−c
′
3 Pr(Eig |X = x) ≤ Pr(Epar,>c′ |X = x). Thus
Pr(Eig |X = x) ≤ 3
1− c′ Pr(Epar,>c′ |X = x) ≤ 3ǫ
(1− c)
(c′ − c)(1− c′) .
Let T ′ denote the random variable you get from running π′ and T the random
variable you get from running π, with a joint distribution in such a way that
(X,L, T ) = (X,L, T ′) unless the players pretends ignorance. We need to show
that there is a decoding function D′ from the set of complete transcripts to
possible values of X such that for each x, Pr(D′(T ′) = x|X = x) ≥ 1 − ǫ′.
From the assumptions about π we know that there is a function D from the
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set of possible transcripts to the support of X such that for each x, Pr(D(T ) =
x|X = x) ≥ 1 − ǫ. We know that in π′ and for fixed x, the players only
pretends ignorance with probability ≤ 3ǫ(1−c)(c′−c)(1−c′) , so by setting D′ = D we get
Pr(D′(T ′) = x|X = x) ≥ 1− ǫ− 3ǫ(1−c)(c′−c)(1−c′) . For sufficiently small ǫ (depending
only on c and c′) this is less than ǫ′ and we are done.
If we add a continuity assumption, we get that the safe and the risky c
capacity are the same.
Corollary 16. Let (L, C) be a L-structure. If the safe c-capacity for (L, C) as
a function of c is right-continuous at c0, or if the risky c-capacity for (L, C) as
a function of c is left-continuous at c0 then the safe c0-capacity for (L, C) and
the risky c0-capacity for (L, C) are the same.
Proof. Assume that the safe c-capacity for (L, C) as a function of c a right-
continuous at c0. Then Lemma 15 shows that the risky c-capacity for (L, C) is
at most the safe c′-capacity for (L, C) for all c′ > c. By continuity assumption,
this gives us that the risky c-capacity for (L, C) is at most the safe c-capacity for
(L, C). Proposition 13 shows the opposite inequality. The proof of the second
part of the corollary is similar.
Corollary 17. Let (L, C) be a L-structure. The safe c-capacity for (L, C) and
the risky c-capacity for (L, C) are the same for all but at most countably many
values c ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. By Proposition 12, the safe c-capacity for (L, C) is a monotone function,
so it is continuous in all but countably many points. Now 16 implies that it is
the same as the risky c-capacity for (L, C) in all but countably many points.
As promised, we can now show that for Indepb the safe and the risky c-
capacities are the same.
Corollary 18. The safe c-capacity for Indepb and the risky c-capacity for
Indepb are the same for all c ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We know from Corollary 8 that the safe c-capacity for Indepb is a con-
tinous function of c. Now Corollary 16 implies that it is the same as the risky
c-capacity for Indepb.
Corollary 19. Let c ∈ (0, 1). The safe c-capacity for Fixed and the risky
c-capacity for Fixed are both − log(1−c)
c
− log(e).
Proof. We know from Proposition 9 that the safe c-capacity for Fixed is at most
− log(1−c)
c
− log(e), we know from Theorem 10 that the risky c′ fixed capacity is
at least − log(1−c)
c
− log(e), and from Corollary 17 that they are the same except
on at most countably many values. Thus they must both be − log(1−c)
c
− log(e)
on all but countably many values. We know from 12 that both are monotone,
so they must both be − log(1−c)
c
− log(e) without exceptions.
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5 The original cryptogenography problem
In [2] the authors studied the following cryptogenographic problem. We flip a
coin, and tell the result to one out of n people. The n− 1 other people do not
know who got the information. Formally that means we take L = (L1, . . . , Ln)
to be the random variable that is uniformly distributed over all {0, 1}-vectors
(l1, . . . , ln) containing exactly one 1 and take X to be uniformly distributed over
{0, 1} independently from L. We let the group of n people use any collaborating
cryptogenography protocol, and afterwards we let Frank guess the result of the
coin flip (his guess depends only on the transcript) and then let Eve guess who
was leaking (her guess can depend on both transcript and Franks guess). Eve
wins if she guess the leaker or if Frank does not guess the result of the coin flip.
Otherwise Frank and the n people communicating wins. We assume that both
Frank and Eve make there guess to maximise the probability that they win,
rather than maximise the probability of being correct.4
In [2] it was shown that the probability that the group wins is below 3/4
and for sufficiently high n it is at least 0.5644. In this section we will generalise
the problem to a situation were more people are leaking and X contains more
information. It is obvious how to generalise X to more information, we simply
take X to be uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , 2⌈h⌉}. It is less obvious to gener-
alise to more leakers. When more people are leaking, it would be unreasonable
to require Eve to guess all the leakers. If this was the rule, one of the leaking
players could just reveal himself as a leaker and say what X is, while the rest of
the leakers behave exactly as the non-leakers. Instead we let Eve guess at one
person and if that person is leaking, she wins.
Definition 8. For fixed values of h, number of leakers l and number of commu-
nicating players n > l and a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π, we let
Succ(h, l, n, π) denote the probability that after the players communicate using
protocol π, Frank will guess the correct value of X but Eve’s guess will not be a
leaker, assuming the Frank and Eve each guess using the strategy that maximise
their own chance of winning. We define
Succ(h, l, n) = sup
π
(Succ(h, l, n, π)),
where the supremum is over all collaborating cryptogenography protocols π.
Finally we define
Succ(h, l) = lim
n→∞
Succ(h, l, n).
In this section we will investigate the asymptotic behaviour of Succ(h, l)
when at least one of l and h tends to infinity. First some propositions.
Proposition 20. The probability that the communicating players wins the game
does not change if Eve is told the value of X before they starts to communicate.
4For example if Pr(L1 = 1, X = 0|T = t) = 0.97, Pr(L1 = 1, X = 1|T = t) = 0.01 and
Pr(L2 = 1, X = 1|T = t) = 0.02 then it is most likely that X = 0. However Frank will guess
that X = 1, even though it is much more likely that X = 0. If Frank instead guessed X = 0
then Eve would guess that plr1 is leaking and then Eve would be certain to win. Once Frank
have guesses X = 1, Eve will guess that plr2 is leaking even though it is much more likely
that plr1 is leaking. This is because, given that Frank is correct, it is more likely that plr2
is leaking, and Eve do not care if she guess correct when Frank is wrong.
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Proof. If Frank guesses the correct value of X , Eve was going to assume that
that was the correct value anyway (as she wants to maximise the probability
that she is correct given that Frank was correct), and if Frank guesses wrong,
she would win anyway.
In the rest of this section, we will assume that Eve knows the value of X .
Proposition 21. Succ(h, l, n) and Succ(h, l) are non-increasing in h.
Proof. Let h > h′ and let π be a protocol for parameters h, l, n and let the secret
be denoted X . We construct a protocol π′ with parameters h′, l, n and secret
denoted by X ′. In the first round of π′, plr1 announce h − h′ independent
and uniformly chosen bits Y , and from then on, everyone follows protocol π for
X = X ′ ◦ Y . It is clear the Succ(h, l, n, π) ≤ Succ(h′, l, n, π′).
Proposition 22. Succ(h, l, n) is non-decreasing in n.
Proof. We use the elimination strategy used in [2]. Let n′ > n and let π be
a protocol for parameters h, l, n. We now construct a sequence of protocols
π′k for parameters h, l, n
′. In the protocol π′k each non-leaking player thinks of
a uniformly chosen number in {1, . . . , k}. First everyone who thought of the
number 1 announce that and they are out, then everyone who thought of the
number 2 and so on, until only n players a left. If two or more player thought of
the same number, we migth end up with less then n players left. In that case the
leakers just announce themselves. If we are left with exactly n players, we know
that the l leakers are still among them, and we have no further information about
who they are. They then use protocol π, and win with probability Succ(h, l, n).
As k →∞, the probability that two players thought of the same number tends
to 0, so Succ(h, l, n′, π′k)→ Succ(h, l, n, π).
Theorem 23. For all p ∈ (0, 1),
lim inf
l→∞
Succ
(⌈(− log(p)
1− p − log(e)
)
l
⌉
, l
)
≥ p.
Proof. We know from Corollary 19 that the safe c-capacity for Fixed is − log(1−c)
c
−
log(e). If we let ǫ > 0, and use this Corollary for c = 1− p+ ǫ/2 we get that for
sufficiently high l, n and h =
⌈(
− log(p)
1−p − log(e)
)
l
⌉
there is a protocol π that
will make Frank’s probability of guessing wrong at most ǫ/2, and seen from
Eve’s prespective, no one is leaking with probability > 1 − p + ǫ/2. By the
union bound, the probability that Frank is wrong or Eve is correct5 is at most
ǫ/2+ 1− p+ ǫ/2, thus the communicating players win with probability at least
p− ǫ.
In particular we have
Corollary 24. Let l→∞ and h = h(l) be a function of l with h = o(l). Then
Succ(h, l)→ 1.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 23 and Proposition 21
5Here we assume that Frank guess on the most likely value of X, and we allow Eve to
use any strategy. It could be that Frank could do better, but he is guarantied at least this
probability of winning.
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Definition 9. Let the distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) be given and let π be a
protocol with transcript T and π′ a protocol with transcript π′. For a tran-
script t of π let µt denote the distribution (X,L1, . . . , Ln)|T=t, and similar for
transcripts t′ of π′. We say that π and π′ are equivalent for (X,L1, . . . , Ln) (or
just equivalent when it is clear what the distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is) if the
distribution of µT is the same as the distribution of µT ′ .
That is, the probability that the posterior distribution of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is µ
has to be the same for both π and π′. Notice that for two different distributions
of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) with the same support, π and π
′ are equivalent for one of
them if and only if they are equivalent for the other distribution. Thus, when
the support of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is clear, we can simply say equivalent.
Proposition 25. If π and π′ are equivalent collaborating cryptogenography pro-
tocols, then Succ(h, l, n, π) = Succ(h, l, n, π′).
The next lemma show that we can ensure that before any player crosses
probability c of having the bit, seen from Eve’s perspective, that player lands
on this probability.
Lemma 26. Let π be any collaborating cryptogenography protocol, let (X,L1, . . . , Ln)
have any distribution and let c ∈ (0, 1). Then there exists an equivalent collabo-
rating cryptogenography protocol π′ such that when we use it on (X,L1, . . . Ln)
and let T ′ denote its transcript, it satisfies: For all x ∈ X , all plri and all
non-empty partial transcripts t′k, if
Pr(Li = 1|T ′k = t′k, X = x) > c.
then there is a k′ < k such that
Pr(Li = 1|T ′k
′
= t′k
′
, X = x) = c
Proof. Let π, (X,L1, . . . , Ln) and c be given, and assume that (x, i) = (x0, i0)
is a counterexample to the requirement from the lemma. We will then construct
a protocol π′ such that (x0, i0) is not a counterexample for π
′, and any (x, i)
that satisfied the requirement for π also satisfy it for π′. By induction, this is
enough to prove the lemma.
We can assume that the messages in π are send one bit at a time. We say a
partial transcript tk is problematic if
Pr(Li0 = 1|T k = tk, X = x0) < c
but
Pr(Li0 = 1|T k+1 = tk ◦m,X = x0) ≥ c.
for some bit value m. Without loss of generality, assume that m = 1. Let
p = Pr(Tk+1 = 1|T k = t′k).
We will use the c-notation from from Section 3, so for example
ctk,x0 = Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X = x0).
Now
c > ctk,x0 = pctk◦1,x0 + (1 − p)ctk◦0,x0
25
so ctk◦0,x0 < c. Let q ∈ (p, 1) be the number such that
c = qctk◦1,x0 + (1− q)ctk◦0,x0 .
Now we modify π. First, the player plrj , who is going to send to k + 1’th
message in π, decides if she would have send 0 or 1 in π. If she would have send
1 she sends the bits 11. If she would have send 0 she send 10 with probability
p(1−q)
q(1−p) ∈ (0, 1), and otherwise she sends 00. In all cases she sends the bits one
at a time. They then continue the protocol π as if only the last of the two
bits had been send. If we let T ′ denote the transcript of the protocol with this
modification, we get
cT ′k+1=tk◦0,x0 = cTk+1=tk◦0,x0 < c
and
cT ′k+1=tk◦1,x0 =
pcTk+1=tk◦1,x0 + (1− p)p(1−q)q(1−p)cTk+1=tk◦0,x0
p+ (1− p)p(1−q)
q(1−p)
=qcTk+1=tk◦0,x0 + (1− q)cTk+1=tk◦1,x0
=c.
So if plrj sends 11 or 10 in the modified protocol, we land on probability c. Let
π′ be the protocol we get from π by doing this modification for each problematic
partial transcript tk in π. It is clear that π and π′ are equivalent, and that any
(x, i) that satisfied the requirement before also do afterwards.
Lemma 27. For any c ∈ (0, 1) and any h, l, n, π, we have Succ(h, l, n, π) ≤
1− ch+l log(1−c)+lc log(e)−c
h
.
Proof. As Succ(h, l, n) is non-decreasing in n, we can assume that n > l
c
, so
that Pr(Li = 1) < c at the beginning. By Lemma 26 and Proposition 25 we can
assume that π satisfy the requirement for π′ in 26.
Let π′ be the protocol that starts of as π, but where the players starts to
pretend ignorance (as in the proof of Lemma 15) if Pr(Li = 1|T k = tk, X =
x) = c for some i, current transcript tk and the true value x of X . This ensures
that Pr(Li = 1|T ′ = t,X = x) for all i and t. Let T ′ be the transcript of π′.
From Theorem 5 we get
I(X ;T ′) ≤
(
− log(1− c)
c
− log(e)
)
l
We let Frank guess as he would if we used protocol π. By Fano’s inequality, (3),
Frank’s probability of being wrong when he only see the transcript of π′ is
Pe ≥H(X |T
′)− 1
log(|X |)
=
H(X)− I(X ;T ′)− 1
log(|X |)
≥
h− l
(
− log(1−c)
c
− log(e)
)
− 1
h
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In the cases where Frank are wrong in π′ there are two possibilities: Either the
players did not pretend ignorance, in which case Frank would also be wrong
if they used protocol π, or they did pretend ignorance so Pr(Li = 1|T k =
tk, X = x) = c for some i and some smallest k. When this first happens Eve
can just ignore all further messages in π and guess that plri is leaking. This
way she is wins with probability at least c. Thus, all the situations in π′ where
Frank guesses wrong, corresponds to situations in π where Eve would win with
probability at least c. So Eve’s probability of winning when the players are
using protocol π is at least
cPe ≥ ch+ l log(1− c) + lc log(e)− c
h
Theorem 28. Let r > 0 be a real number. Now
lim sup
l→∞
Succ(⌈r log(e)l⌉, l) ≤ log(r + 1)
r log(e)
Proof. Set c = r
r+1 and h = ⌈r log(e)l⌉ in Lemma 27. Then Eve’s probability of
winning is at least
r⌈r log(e)l⌉ − l(r + 1) log(r + 1) + lr log(e)− r
⌈r log(e)l⌉(r + 1)
As l tends to infinity, this tends to
r2 log(e)− (r + 1) log(r + 1) + r log(e)
r log(e)(r + 1)
= 1− log(r + 1)
r log(e)
as wanted.
In particular we have
Corollary 29. Let h→∞ and let l = l(h) be a function of h with l(h) = o(h).
Then Succ(h, l)→ 0.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 28 and Proposition 21.
6 Hiding among innocents
Until now we have assumed, that even the players who are not trying to leak
information will collaborate. In this section we will show that we do not need
the non-leakers to collaborate. As long as some people are communicating
innocently, and that communication is sufficiently non-deterministic, we can
use these people as if they were collaborating.
Formally, we model the innocent communication by an innocent communica-
tion protocol. While protocols usually are designed to compute some function,
innocent communication protocols is a way of describing what is already going
on. An innocent communication protocol ι is a protocol that for each possible
partial transcript sk and each player i gives a finite set Ai,sk of possible messages
that that person can send in the next round, and a probability distribution on
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that set. In innocent communication protocols every person sends a message in
each round. This assumption is not a restriction: if we have a protocol where
only one players sends messages at a time, we can turn it into an innocent com-
munication protocol, by requiring that all the other players sends the message
“no message” with probability 1. We will only be interested in innocent commu-
nication protocols that continues for infinitely many rounds. This assumption
is of course unrealistic but in practice we only need it to be long.
Let S denote the random variable that is the infinite transcript we get from
running ι, and let Sk denote the partial transcript of the first k rounds. For a
player plrj and a partial transcript s
k of the first k rounds of ι we define
pmax,j(s
k) = max
a
(Pr(Aj,sk = a)|Sk = sk),
where Aj,sk is the message sent by plrj in round k + 1. We say that ι is
informative if for a random transcript S and for each player
∏
k∈N pmax,j(S
k) =
0 with probability 1. In other words, if at each round in the protocol you try
to guess what message plrj will send in the next round, then with probability
1 you will eventually fail. Notice that the model for innocent communication
here is equivalent to what is used in [5], and the definition of informative is
almost the same as the definition of always informative in [5] when one player
is communicating.6
We say that a collaborating cryptogenography protocol π is revealing if there
is a partial transcript tk and a player plrj that is to send the next message A
when the transcript is tk and a message a such that plrj will send message a
with positive probability if Lj = 1 but not if Lj = 0. If this is not the case, we
say that π is non-revealing.7 The point in cryptogenography is to hide who is
sending the information, so we are only interested in non-revealing protocols.
The main theorem of this section is
Theorem 30. Let π be a non-revealing collaborating cryptogenography protocol,
and let ι be an informative communication protocol. Then there exists a protocol
ιπ that is equivalent to π, but where the non-leakers follow the protocol ι.
Proof. We construct the protocol ιπ and a the same time an interpretation
function i that sends transcripts s of ιπ to transcripts t of π. We want them to
satisfy.
1. For each partial transcript sk of ιπ and each player plrj , ι
π gives a prob-
ability distribution, depending only on X,Lj, s
k and j that plrj will use
to choose his next message.
2. If Lj = 0 then plrj choose her messages in ι
π using the same distributions
as in ι.
3. The interpretation function i sends (infinite) transcripts s of ιπ to either
transcripts t of π or to “error”. The probability of error is 0.
6The difference is that in [5],
∏
k∈N pmax,i(T
k) have to go to 0 exponentially fast.
7A non-revealing protocol can also reveal who the leakers are. For example, if it is known
that one person is leaking and all but one person sends a message that could not have been
send by a leaker. However if Pr(L = (0, . . . , 0)) > 0 then a non-revealing protocol will never
reveal anyone as a leaker.
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4. If T denote the transcript of π and S denotes the transcript of ιπ, then
given that i(S) is not error, (X,L1, . . . , Ln, i(S)) is distributed as (X,L1, . . . , Ln, T ).
5. For each transcript t of π, the random variable (X,L1, . . . , Ln) is indepen-
dent from S given i(S) = t.
Here the second requirement ensures that non-leakers can follow the protocol
without knowing X or π. In fact, unlike in the collaborating communication
protocol, they might be thinking that everyone is just having an innocent con-
versation. Thus in ιπ we refer to the non-leakers as innocents. Notice the
important assumption that first the innocent communication protocol ι is de-
fined and then we create a protocol ιπ for leaking information on top of that.
This corresponds to assuming that the non-leaking players either do not care
about the leak, or that they are oblivious to the protocol. If ι was allowed to
depend what the leakers does, the non-leaking players could try to prevent the
leak, and it would be a very different problem.
The fourth of the above requirements tells us that ιπ reveals at least as much
about (X,L1, . . . , Ln) as π and the last requirement say that we do not learn
anything more. This ensures that Frank and Eve, who both know ιπ , learns
exactly as much from the transcript of ιπ as they would from the transcript of
π.
Proposition 31. If ιπ satisfy the above requirements, then ιπ and π are equiv-
alent.
Proof. i gives error with probability 0, so we can ignore all those cases. By
requirement 4, i(S) has the same distribution as T , and by requirement 4 and
5 the distribution µs of (X,L1, . . . , Ln) given S = s equals the distribution
µi(s).
Before we construct the protocol ιπ we will define a function i′ that sends
partial transcripts sk
′
of ιπ to tuples (tk, [y, z)) where tk is a partial transcript of
π, and [y, z) ⊂ [0, 1) is a half-open interval. When i′(sk′) = (tk, [y, z)), we refer
to tk as the interpretation of sk
′
. Loosely speaking, the point of the interval
is that not all message in ι are sufficiently unlikely that they can correspond
to a message in π, so instead of interpreting them to a message in π, we store
the information by remembering an interval. For an infinite transcript s, the
function i′ will satisfy
1. i′(λ) = (λ, [0, 1)), where λ is the empty string
2. If i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) then either
• i′(sk′+1) = (tk ◦m, [0, 1)) for some message m in π, or
• i′(sk′+1) = (tk, [y′, z′)), where [y′, z′) ⊆ [y, z)
3. If i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) and tk is a complete transcript for π, then y = 0,
z = 1 and i′(sk
′′
) = (tk, [0, 1)) for all k′′ ≥ k′
Thus every time we reveal one more round from the transcript s, we will either
learn one message in π from the interpretation of s, or the interval gets smaller
or stays the same. If the interpretation of sk
′
is tk, we let j(sk
′
) denote the index
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of the player to send the next message in π when the current transcript is tk.
When it is clear what sk
′
is, we write j instead of j(sk
′
). If i(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z))
and i(sk
′+1) = (tk ◦m, [0, 1)) we say that at time k′ plrj(sk′ ) finished sending
the message m in π and at time k′ + 1 plrj(sk′+1) start sending a new message
in π.
Let Atk denote the set of messages that plrj could send in π after transcript
tk, and choose some ordering on this set. We now define a function f : [0, 1)→
Atk such that
f−1(a) = [Pr(A < a|Lj = 0),Pr(A ≤ a|Lj = 0)).
By definition of innocent communication protocol, each message in ι is chosen
from a finite set, but to explain the point of the function f , imagine for now that
ι said that in the next round plrj should send a random real uniformly from
in [0, 1). We could now interpret that as the message f(x) ∈ Atk in π. Then ιπ
would say that if plrj was innocent he should send a number uniformly from
[0, 1) and if he was leaking, he should first choose a ∈ Atk using the distribution
specified by π, and then send a number chosen uniformly at random from f−1(a).
More generally, if ι said that plrj should choose his next messageM from some
continuous distribution on R, we could take the quantile function given Lj = 0
of the message
m 7→ Pr(M < m|Lj = 0)
to turn it into a message that is uniform on [0, 1) given Lj = 0. Unfortunately,
there is only finitely many possible message for plrj to sent in each round, so
instead of getting a number out of the quantile function, we define a similar
function to get an interval. Let i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [y, z)) and let Mj,sk′ denote the
set of possible message that plrj can send in round k
′ + 1 when transcript is
sk
′
and choose some ordering on the set. Define g : [y, z)→Mj,sk′ by
g−1(m) = {y + t(z − y)|t ∈ [Pr(M < m|Lj = 0),Pr(M ≤ m|Lj = 0))}.
Thus instead of getting a number in [0, 1) out of m ∈Mj,sk′ , we get an interval
g−1(m), whose length is proportional to the probability that an innocent player
would send that message. If g−1(m) ⊂ f−1(a) for some a ∈ Atk we say that
plrj send a in π and define i
′(sk
′+1) = (tk ◦ a, [0, 1)). Otherwise, plrj is not
done sending his message and we define i′(sk
′+1) = (tk, g−1(m)). Now if for
some k′ we have i′(sk
′
) = (t, [0, 1)) where t is a complete transcript of π we
define i′(sk
′′
) = (t, [0, 1)) for all k′′ > k′ and i(s) = t. If for some s no such k′
exists, we define i(s) to give “error”.
Next we define the protocol ιπ. Any non-leaking player chooses his messages
as given by ι and when the current transcript is sk
′
all players except plrj(sk′ )
also choose their messages as in ι. When a leaking player, plrj(sk′ ), starts
sending a message in π, he first chose the message a ∈ Atk using the distribution
given by π (this distribution depends on X = x). Next he chooses a number α
randomly and uniform in f−1(a). Until he has send his message in π he will now
send messages m such that α ∈ g−1(m). This uniquely specifies which messages
m to send (notice that g will depend on current transcript in ιπ, so m is not
necessarily the same for every round). When we get to a transcript sk
′
that is
interpreted as a complete transcript t of π all the players will just follow ι.
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Figure 1: Example of how to construct a part of ιπ .
In this figure we see an example of how construct a part of ιπ. In π, the
next player to send a message is plrj . The message A1 should come from
A = {a1, a2}. We have Pr(A1 = a1|Lj = 0) = 0.4, so f : [0, 1) → A sends
x ∈ [0, 0.4) to a1, and x ∈ [0.4, 1) to a2. Now Lj = 1, so plrj first chooses a
message from A to send, this happens to be a1, and then a number α chosen
randomly and uniformly from f−1(a1).
In ι, the next message M1 that plrj sends should be from M1 = {m11,m21}. If
plrj was innocent and was following the protocol ι, we would have Pr(M1 =
m11) = 0.6, so g1 : [0, 1)→M1 sends x ∈ [0, 0.6) to m11 and the rest to m21. As
α ∈ [0, 0.6), plrj now sends the message m11. We see that g−11 (m11) overlaps
with both f−1(a1) and f−1(a2), so and observer cannot yet determine which
message in π plri was sending, so plrj has not send his message yet. His next
message M2 should be send from M2 = {m12,m22}, and again it happens that
if he was following ι then Pr(M2 = m
1
2) = 0.6, so g2 : [0, 0.6) → M2 sends
x ∈ [0, 0.36) to m12 and the rest to m22. As α ∈ [0, 0.36), plrj sends the message
m12, and now g
−1
2 (m
1
2) ⊂ f−1(a1), so now an observer can see that plrj was
sending the message a1 in π, and plrj is done sending his message in π.
We see that if in π a leaking player’s distribution of a is exactly the same
as a non-leaking players, then the distribution of the number α chosen by the
leaking player in uniform on [0, 1). By the definition of g, the probability that
a leaking player sends a particular message m in ιπ is exactly the probability
given by ι, and thus the same as a non-leaking player. Using this reasoning in
the opposite direction, this tells us that we can assume that even the innocents,
when starting sending a message in π, chooses a uniformly distributed α ∈ [0, 1)
and sends the message m such that α ∈ g(m), until they have send the message
in π. They may not do that, but the probability of any transcript is the same
as if they did.
Finally we need to check that ιπ satisfy the 5 requirements. The first two
follows from the construction. To show the third, we need to show that with
for a random transcript s of ιπ there will with probability 1 exists a k′ such
that i′(sk
′
) = (t, [0, 1)) where t is a complete transcript for π. As π only have
finitely many rounds, it is enough to show that for each message of π we start
sending in ιπ, there is probability 1 that we will finish sending it. Assume that
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i′(sk
′
) = (tk, [0, 1)) for some k′, where tk is an incomplete transcript of π, but
for all k′′ > k′ the interpretation of sk
′′
is still tk. If plrj(sk′ ) is innocent,
everyone will be following ι, so by the assumption that ι is informative, the set
of transcripts where the length of the interval does not go to 0 has probability
0. As stated earlier we can assume that when sending a message in π, even the
innocents starts by choosing a random number α uniformly from [0, 1). As f
only jumps in finitely many points, there is probability 0 that plrj(sk′ ) chooses
one of these points. If he does not, and the length of the interval goes to 0, he
will eventually sent his message in π. Thus there is probability 0 that a non-
leaker does not send his message. A leaker chooses his random α ∈ [0, 1) using a
different distribution, but we can divide [0, 1) into a finite set of intervals (given
by f−1(a)) such that it is uniform on each of these intervals. This tells us that
given sk
′
there is a constant K such that, as long as plrj(sk′ ) is still sending
the same message in π, any continuation of the transcript is at most K times
more likely when plrj(sk′ ) is leaking as when he is not leaking. Thus there is
still probability K · 0 = 0 that he will not finish his message in π.
For the fourth requirement, we observe that any leaking player is actually
choosing messages in π following the distribution given by π, and then making
sure that the message send in ιπ will be interpreted as the message he wanted
to send in π. The innocent players are not doing this, but we have seen that the
distribution on the message they send in ιπ are the same as if they did. Thus
requirement 4 holds. Finally we see that given i(S) = t a player not sending
a message in π always follows ι and a player sending a message in π can be
thought of as haven chosen an α uniformly from f−1(a) where a is the next
message in transcript t. This is independent from (X,L1, . . . , Ln) and thus the
last requirement follows.
To implement the protocol ιπ the leaking players do not have to chose all
the infinitely many digits in a random number α. Instead they can just for each
message compute the probability that they would send each message, given that
they had chosen an α. We also see that if i(S) does not give an error, then there
is some k such that Sk determines i(S). Thus for any particular ιπ and any
ǫ > 0 there is a length k such that, i(Sk) gives a total transcript for π with
probability > 1− ǫ.
In order to find the protocol ιπ you need have a description of the protocol ι.
This is a strong assumption: even if you are able to communicate innocently, it
does not mean that you are aware of the distribution you use to pick your random
messages. In steganography, the weaker assumption that you have a random
oracle that takes history and player index as input and gives a message following
the innocent distribution as output, is sometimes enough [5]. However, it is not
clear if this weaker assumption is enough for the propose of cryptogenography.
While it may not be possible to find ι for all kinds of innocent communications,
there are situations where we can approximate ι very well. For example, if a
person post blog posts, we can consider the message to be only parity of the
minutes in the sending time. This value will probably, for most people, be close
to uniformly distributed on {0, 1}.
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7 Open problems
In this paper we only considered how much information l players can leak in an
asymptotic sense, where l tends to infinity, and the proof of the achievability
results is not constructive. We have not tried to find any explicit protocols that
work well for fixed specific values of l and tolerance of errors ǫ, but that would
be an interesting possibility for further research. We assumed that both Eve and
Frank knew the true distribution q of (X,L1, . . . , Ln). It might be interesting
to consider the problem where their beliefs, qE and qF are different from q and
from each other.
We have only found the c-capacity for Fixed and for Indepb. It would be
interesting to find a way to compute the capacity of more general L-structures.
In the setup we considered here, there are two types of players. Some know
the information that we want to leak and some do not. We could also imagine
that some people know who knows the information, without knowing the in-
formation itself, and some could know who knows who knows the information
and so on. We could also have people who would only know X if it belongs to
some set S, and otherwise only know that X /∈ S. It is known from the game
theory literature that all of this can be described by having a joint distribu-
tion (X,P1, . . . , Pn) where X is the information we want to leak and Pi is the
random variable that player i has as information [1].
A different generalisation would be to have players that tries to prevent the
leakage by sending misleading information. Such players would also not want to
be discovered. If Frank notice that someone is sending misleading information,
he could just ignore all the messages send by that person.
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